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FIFTH AMENDMENT-COERCION AND
CLARITY: THE SUPREME COURT
APPROVES ALTERED MIRANDA
WARNINGS
Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Duckworth v. Eagan,' the United States Supreme Court ruled
that advising a suspect that counsel could only be appointed for him
"if and when you go to court" does not render Miranda 2 warnings
inadequate because the warnings in Duckworth reasonably conveyed
to the suspect his rights.3 This opinion is justified since the warn-
ings in Duckworth accurately reflect the procedure employed in ob-
taining appointed counsel. Thus, criticism of the warnings should
be directed at this procedure and not at the content of the warnings.
In a concurring opinion, the Court also hinted that it would con-
sider extending Stone v. Powell4 to bar the relitigation in federal
habeas corpus proceedings of nonconstitutional claims under Mi-
randa.5 This extension of Stone would be inappropriate since apply-
ing the reasoning in Stone to Miranda claims would not lead to the
exclusion of those claims in habeas proceedings.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
On the evening of May 16, 1982, GaryJames Eagan (hereinafter
"Eagan") and some companions picked up a woman in South Chi-
cago, Illinois. 6 They then joined a larger group and drove to a
beach in Indiana along the Lake Michigan shoreline where the wo-
man had sex with several men in this group.7 Eagan and his com-
1 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (the Court established the re-
quirement of warning suspects of their constitutional rights as a procedural safeguard to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination).
3 109 S. Ct. at 2878-79.
4 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text for an explana-
tion of the holding in Stone.
5 Id. at 2881-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1555 (7th Cir. 1988).
7 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2878.
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panions then separated from the larger group apparently desiring to
continue having sex with the victim, but the victim refused their ad-
vances. 8 A struggle ensued, and the victim was stabbed nine times.9
Eagan then fled the scene of the crime and returned to his apart-
ment in Chicago where he called a Chicago policeman to report that
he had seen the naked body of a dead woman lying on a beach. 10
The policeman and his partner then met Eagan at his apart-
ment, and Eagan led them to the location of the victim where they
found her moaning and screaming for help."I Upon seeing Eagan,
the victim exclaimed, "Why did you stab me? Why did you stab
me?"' 12 Eagan denied stabbing the woman, claiming that he had dis-
covered the woman while he was "there for a party."' 13 Later, upon
ascertaining that the crime had been committed in Indiana, the Chi-
cago Police turned over the investigation to the Hammond, Indiana
Police Department.' 4
Hammond police detectives arrived at the scene of the crime on
the morning of May 17, 1982, where they talked with Eagan. 15 He
told the detectives that he had been attacked on the lakefront that
evening, and that the woman had been abducted by several men. 16
Eagan then went to a local police station to fill out a battery claim. 17
Later, the detectives asked Eagan to come down to the Hammond
police headquarters to make a statement and be questioned.' 8
Eagan agreed, and shortly after 11:00 that morning, the detectives
questioned the petitioner about the incident. 19
Before questioning, Eagan was read the following warnings
from a waiver form entitled "Voluntary Appearance; Advice of
Rights." 20 The form stated:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be
used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice
before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning.
You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you
8 Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1555.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 1558.
11 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2877.
12 Id.
13 Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1559.
14 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2877.
15 Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1559.







cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one
will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish
to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right
to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to
stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.2 1
Eagan then signed the form and repeated his exculpatory explana-
tion of his activities on that previous evening.2 2 Eagan was subse-
quently placed in the "lock-up" in the basement of the Hammond
police headquarters. 23
Approximately twenty-nine hours later, the detectives again in-
terviewed Eagan.24 They advised him of his rights by reading to him
a waiver of rights form which stated:
1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the
right to remain silent and that anything I might say may or will be used
against me in a court of law.
2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own
choice before saying anything, and that an attorney may be present
while I am making any statement or throughout the course of any con-
versation with any police officer if I so choose.
3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the
course of the taking of any statement or during the course of any such
conversation.
4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to answer
any further questions and remain silent, thereby terminating the
conversation.
5. That if I cannot hire an attorney, one will be provided for me. 25
After reading and signing this form, Eagan confessed to stabbing
the woman. 26 The next morning he led the detectives to the beach
where the incident occurred. 2 7 There, the police recovered the
knife used in the stabbing as well as several items of the victim's
clothing.28 Eagan was subsequently put on trial for rape and at-
tempted murder. 29
At a suppression hearing before his trial, the defense moved to
suppress Eagan's confession, initial statement, the knife, and the
21 Id. (emphasis in original).
22 Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1560.
23 The detectives had probable cause to believe that Eagan was the assailant since
they were aware of the victim's statement and "were also aware of certain discrepancies
in the story [Eagan] originally told them, which they believed inconsistent with estab-
lished facts." Respondent's Brief at 12, Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989)
(No. 88-317).
24 Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1560.
25 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. 2877-78.






clothing.30 This motion was denied, and over an objection, the state
court admitted all this evidence in a jury trial.3 ' The jury found
Eagan guilty of attempted murder, and he was sentenced to thirty-
five years imprisonment.3 2
Eagan appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court alleging that the
trial court erred in admitting his statements as well as the physical
evidence uncovered with his assistance because the, first waiver did
not comply with the requirements of Miranda and thus was constitu-
tionally defective. 33 The court upheld the conviction, stating that
"the record supports the trial court's conclusion that [the] Defend-
ant's first statement was voluntary, and therefore admissible."3 4
One justice dissented, finding the warning containing the "if and
when you go to court" phrase to be uncertain in that this phrase
conditioned his right to an attorney on a possible future event, and
in that the second set of warnings did not adequately clarify this
uncertainty.3 5
Eagan then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, repeating the claims made in front of the Indiana Supreme
Court.3 6 The court denied the petition and held that the police ad-
hered to the requirements of Miranda in taking Eagan's first and sec-
ond statements.3 7 Eagan then appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 38 That court held that the warn-
ing containing the "if and when you go to court" phrase was "con-
stitutionally defective because it denies an accused indigent a clear
and unequivocal warning of the right to appointed counsel before
any interrogation. ' 3 9 The warning was held unclear because "[t]he
30 Joint Appendix to Briefs at 51, Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989) (No. 88-317).
31 Id.
32 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2878.
33 Eagan v. State, 480 N.E.2d 946 (Ind. 1985).
34 Id. at 950.
35 Id. at 952 (DeBruler,J., dissenting). Justice DeBruler also found these warnings to
be condemned by the holding in California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981). Id.
(DeBruler, J., dissenting).
36 Joint Appendix to Briefs at 49-52, Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989) (No. 88-317)
[hereinafter Joint Appendix].
37 Joint Appendix, supra note 36, at 52. Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the
issue decided upon by the district court as clearly in favor of finding the statements to be
voluntarily made. See Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2878. However, Judge Allen Sharp stated
in the district court opinion that "candor requires this court to admit that [the issue of
voluntariness] is a close one as is well illustrated by the dissenting opinion of Justice
DeBruler." Joint Appendix, supra, note 36, at 50.
38 Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1555 (7th Cir. 1988).
39 Id. at 1557 (citing United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1249-
50 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that warnings which contained the sbntence, "We have no
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'if and when' language limits and conditions an indigent's right to
counsel on a future event." 40 The court then held that the second
set of warnings did not explicitly correct the confusion created by
the first warning.4 t The court therefore reversed the district court's
order and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the pres-
ence of an attorney during the second interrogation. 42
One judge dissented from this determination, stating that the
majority's "formalistic, technical, and unrealistic application of Mi-
randa has been soundly rejected by the vast majority of other circuits
deciding the issue.... ."43 Furthermore, he determined that the first
statement was given voluntarily, that the second set of warnings was
constitutionally sufficient, and that the second statement was made
voluntarily. 44 Therefore, relying upon Oregon v. Elstad,45 he found a
remand to be unnecessary.4 6 The court of appeals denied rehearing
en banc, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988. 4 7
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,48 initially noted
that the Court granted certiorari in this case to "resolve a conflict
among the lower courts as to whether informing a suspect that an
attorney would be appointed for him 'if and when you go to court'
way of furnishing you with an attorney, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if
and when you go to court," were unclear and thus did not satisfy the requirements of
Miranda)).
40 Id. at 1557.
41 Id. at 1558.
42 Id. This determination was not made by the court presumably because the major-
ity believed that without the trial court transcript there was not a sufficient factual basis
to find the second statement admissible. See Respondent's Brief at 34-36, Duckworth v.
Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989) (No. 88-317).
43 Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1562 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 1571-75 (Coffey,J., dissenting).
45 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985) (holding that a suspect who voluntarily answers ques-
tions before receiving liranda warnings may still be considered to have voluntarily
waived his rights at a later interrogation). This case was cited for the proposition that
inadequate warnings on one occasion will not necessarily make a court determine that
all statements made after that occasion are coerced. Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1572-73 (Coffey,
J., dissenting).
46 Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1571-75 (Coffey, J., dissenting). This finding is questionable
since the evidence which he relied upon may not have been properly part of the record
before the court. See supra note 31.
47 109 S. Ct. 218 (1988).
48 The opinion of the Court was joined by Justices White and Kennedy.
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renders Miranda warnings inadequate. ' 49 The Chief Justice deline-
ated the issues properly before the Court by noting that the issue of
whether to extend Stone to the facts of this case was not argued by
the petitioner, and therefore would not be decided in the case at
bar.50 Also, because the Chief Justice upheld the validity of the
warnings in question, the Court did not need to discuss the volunta-
riness of the second statement.5 1
ChiefJustice Rehnquist began his analysis by stating the impact
of Miranda52 on modem criminal procedure. The Supreme Court in
Miranda "established certain procedural safeguards that require po-
lice to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interroga-
tion." 53 The Miranda decision further established the rule that
statements made under custodial circumstances are inadmissible un-
less the suspect is specifically warned of his/her rights and freely
decides to forego those rights. 54
The Chief Justice stated that Miranda warnings do not have to
be given exactly as they are described in the Miranda decision. 55 As
support for this proposition, several cases were cited in which refer-
ences were made to possible equivalents of the warnings as stated in
Miranda.56 The Chief Justice next pointed out that the required
warnings should be regarded as measures taken to protect the sus-
pect's fifth amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination,
and not as constitutionally protected rights in and of themselves. 57
Reasoning from these points, the ChiefJustice asserted that the ex-
49 Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2878 (1989).
50 Id. at 2879 n.3.
51 Id. at 2881.
52 See supra note 2.
53 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2879.
54 Id. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)).
55 The exact words used by the Court in Miranda read:
[Hie has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
56 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2879 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 ("the warnings re-
quired and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the ab-
sence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to admissibility .. "); Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980) ("the now familiar Miranda warnings ... or their
equivalent"); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) ("This Court has never
indicated that the 'rigidity' of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warn-
ings given a criminal defendant .... Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incanta-
tion was required to satisfy its strictures.")).




act language of warnings given pursuant to Miranda need not be
closely scrutinized. 58 Rather, the inquiry should be "whether the
warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required
by Miranda.' -59
Having established a standard by which to judge the validity of
warnings, ChiefJustice Rehnquist proceeded to analyze the particu-
lar warnings in question. He first stated that the "warnings given to
respondent touched all the bases required by Miranda,"60 and noted
that Eagan was given every one of the required warnings. 6' The
ChiefJustice then addressed the sentence in the warning which said,
"[The police] have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." The
inclusion of this sentence was found to be valid for two reasons,
both related to the legal accuracy of the statement.
First, the statement "accurately described the procedure for the
appointment of counsel in Indiana." 62 Under Indiana law, indigents
are appointed counsel at their initial court appearance. 63 Thus, the
inclusion of the statement would correctly answer a possible ques-
tion of a suspect. As the Court said, "We think it must be relatively
commonplace for a suspect, after receiving Miranda warnings, to ask
when he will obtain counsel. The 'if and when' advice simply antici-
pates that question." 64
Second, the statement is accurate in that Miranda does not re-
quire that appointed counsel be "producible on call" 65 or that "each
police station must have a 'station house lawyer' present at all times
to advise prisoners." 66 So, when an indigent suspect asks for a law-
yer, the police are not required to provide counsel that instant.
Rather, the police are merely required to cease their interrogation
58 Id. at 2880.
59 Id. (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361).
60 Id. at 2880.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 IND. CODE § 35-33-7-6 (1988). This appearance would be the suspect's arraign-
ment since, under Indiana law, charges must be filed at or before that hearing. IND.
CODE § 35-33-7-3(a) (1988). Respondent suggested that this procedure was violative of
his rights, arguing that "[iut is no answer to say.., that the instant warnings are accepta-
ble because the police did nothing more than explain the Indiana procedure. An accu-
rate description of a constitutionally deficient procedure does not make the procedure
proper." Brief for Respondent at 35, Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989) (No.
88-317). However, the issue of the constitutionality of the procedure for obtaining ap-
pointed counsel in Indiana was never presented before the Court.
64 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880 (footnote omitted).
65 Id.
66 Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
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of the suspect until a lawyer is appointed for him.67 Therefore,
since the warning accurately states that appointed counsel is not in-
stantly obtainable, it is a valid warning.
The opinion next turns to an analysis of California v. Prysock,68
where the Court stated in dicta that Miranda warnings would be de-
fective if the reference to the right to appointed counsel was linked
to a future point in time after the police interrogation. 69 ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist interpreted Prysock as meaning that any warnings that
"would not apprise the accused of his right to have an attorney pres-
ent if he chose to answer questions" would be defective. 70 The
Chief Justice then concluded that, because the warning advised the
suspect both of his right to the presence of counsel before any ques-
tioning and of his right to stop answering questions at any time, the
warning, in its totality, 71 could not have suffered from this defect. 72
In other words, it did not matter that a link was made between an
indigent suspect's ability to obtain appointed counsel and a future
event so long as a link was not made between that suspect's right to
appointed counsel and a future event. Accordingly, the judgment of
the Seventh Circuit was reversed.
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in order to argue
that the rationale of the Court's opinion in Stone 73 should be ex-
tended to bar relitigation of non-constitutional Miranda claims in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.74 The district court noted in its
opinion that Eagan's claim may not be cognizable under Stone, but
considered the claim anyway because the issue has not been re-
solved by the Supreme Court.75 Justice O'Connor justified her
treatment of this issue by claiming that the opinion is based upon
the "equitable nature" of the writ of habeas corpus. 76
67 Id.
68 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
69 Id. at 360.
70 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2881.
71 The United States specifically argued in an amicus curiae brief that the questiona-
ble phrase could not be looked at in isolation, but must be examined in the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the warnings including the other advisements made
within the warnings. Amicus Brief at 16, Duckworth (No. 88-317).
72 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2881.
73 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
74 Id. at 2881-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The concurring opinion was joined by
Justice Scalia.
75 Joint Appendix, supra note 36, at 50.




Justice O'Connor's analysis began by noting that while eighteen
state and federal judges considered respondent's Miranda claims,
"None of these judges has intimated any doubt as to [Eagan's] guilt
or the voluntariness or probative value of his confession." 77 She
then asserted her view that society's interest in punishing criminals
outweighs the marginal increase in police adherence to Miranda that
results from exclusion of evidence on collateral review in federal
habeas proceedings. 78 Thus, she concluded that "the federal
courts' exercise of habeas jurisdiction in this case has served no
one .... "79
Justice O'Connor then discussed Stone and its applicability to
this case. In Stone, the Supreme Court held that fourth amendment
claims could not be litigated in federal habeas proceedings where
the issue had been fully and fairly litigated in the state courts.80 The
Court reached this decision by weighing the costs and benefits in
federal habeas proceedings of excluding evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment and deciding that the costs outweighed
the benefits.8 ' Justice O'Connor weighed the costs of excluding evi-
dence obtained as a result of inadequate or defective Miranda warn-
ings against the benefits of applying the Miranda exclusionary rule in
habeas proceedings and stated that "the scales appear to me to tip
further toward finality and repose in this context [technical Miranda
violations] than in Stone itself."8 2
Justice O'Connor noted the costs of enforcing Miranda claims in
federal habeas proceedings. Habeas proceedings offend principles
of federalism by creating situations in which federal district courts
sit in "review" of state supreme courts.83 Furthermore, enforcing
these claims is contrary to society's interest in punishing criminals
because "[e]xcluding probative evidence years after trial, when a
new trial may be a practical impossibility, will often result in the re-
lease of an admittedly guilty individual who may pose a threat to
77 Id. at 2882 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 2883-84. Justice O'Connor argued that the weighing process favors applica-
tion of the Miranda exclusionary rule to these claims when they are raised in the direct
review of criminal convictions. Id. at 2883, 2885. Justice O'Connor cited as authority
for treating claims differently on collateral review than on direct review the following
cases: Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767-69 (1987) (Stevens, J. concurring); United
States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-29
(1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
79 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2882 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80 Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
81 Id. at 489-93. For further discussion of the Stone decision, see infra notes 161-67
and accompanying text.
82 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 2884 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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society."'8 4 Justice O'Connor also observed that "[e]xclusion [of
probative evidence in federal habeas review] teaches not respect for
the law, but casts the criminal system as a game, and sends the
message that society is so unmoved by the violation of its own laws
that it is willing to frustrate their enforcement for the smallest of
returns." 85 Each of these costs outweigh whatJustice O'Connor re-
gards as the minimal benefit of the exercise of federal habeas juris-
diction over Miranda claims, which is the slight increase in police
adherence to the dictates of Miranda.8 6  Therefore, Justice
O'Connor would bar such claims from being relitigated through col-
lateral review.
To support this view, Justice O'Connor made a distinction be-
tween constitutional and nonconstitutional Miranda claims. This
was based upon the observation that "the Miranda rule 'sweeps
more broadly than the fifth amendment itself' and 'may be triggered
even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.' "8s7 Thus, as-
suming that a claim involves a violation of Miranda but not a viola-
tion of the fifth amendment-in other words, rights were knowingly
and voluntarily waived, but the warnings given were defective-the
petitioner's claim would be regarded as a nonconstitutional Miranda
claim. This type of claim is theoretically not guilt-related since
statements which are not the product of coercion are not presump-
tively unreliable. 8
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens, Justice Marshall charged the majority opinion with "se-
riously mischaracterizing" the Miranda decision in order to reach its
opinion. 89 Justice Marshall also expressed disagreement with the
concurring opinion on the issue of extending the Stone rationale to
cases concerning Miranda claims. 90
The dissent began with its own analysis of Miranda. While
agreeing with the majority that "Miranda mandated no specific ver-
84 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 2883 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
306-10 (1985)).
88 Id. at 2884 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (citing Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collat-
eralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 142, 163 (1970)).
89 Id. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Id. 2885-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not join
this part of the dissent.
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bal formulation that police must use," 9 1 the dissent pointed out
that, regardless of the exact form of the warnings, the offer of ap-
pointed counsel must be "clear and unequivocal.- 92 Thus, a deci-
sion which holds that warnings can satisfy the dictates of Miranda by
merely "reasonably convey[ing]" to the suspect his rights, but not
by being clear and unequivocal "makes a mockery of [the Miranda
decision].'"9'
Turning to the warnings in question, Justice Marshall agreed
with the Seventh Circuit that advising Eagan of his right to the pres-
ence of counsel before and during questioning, and then telling him
that appointed counsel could only be obtained if and when he went
to court, could have led Eagan to believe that he did not have the
right to an attorney before interrogation if he could not afford to
hire one on his own.94 Eagan may have believed that he was not
entitled to an attorney until he went to trial, or if he was not taken to
court, that he would not be entitled to an attorney at all.95
Justice Marshall also argued that by parsing the questionable
warnings in "lawyer-like" fashion, the majority ignored the fact that
the warnings are most likely to be given to "frightened suspects un-
lettered in law, not legal experts schooled in interpreting legal or
semantic nuance."'9 6 These people would be less likely to properly
understand the warnings than would the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court or other people with extensive legal training and
experience. 97 Therefore, since the warnings in question can be eas-
ily misunderstood by laymen, they are defective.
Further, Justice Marshall argued that the warnings do not be-
come valid merely because they accurately describe the Indiana pro-
cedure for obtaining appointed counsel. He pointed out that an
accurate description of the procedure without a mention of the re-
quirement that the suspect may only be held in custody for a reason-
able period of time before he is charged creates "an effective means
by which the police can pressure a suspect to speak without the
presence of counsel." 98 Thus, he argued that by approving the
warning because it does not misrepresent the Indiana procedure for
91 Id. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966)).
93 Id. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 2886-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 Justice Marshall points out that in common parlance, "going to court" means "go-
ing to trial." Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, a suspect must realize that he will
not avoid imprisonment by talking, since if he confesses, he will surely be imprisoned.
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obtaining appointed counsel, the Court is sanctioning an inherently
coercive state practice. 99 Thus, mere procedural accuracy should
not be a justification for approving a particular warning.
Justice Marshall then expressed his disagreement with the ma-
jority's interpretation of Prysock 100 and offered his own analysis of
that case. Unlike the majority, Justice Marshall made no distinction
between statements which link the right to counsel with a future
event and statements which link the ability to obtain counsel with a
future event. He found that Prysock condemned all warnings where
references to appointed counsel are linked to a future point in time
after police interrogation. Since the warning in question makes
such a link, it falls into the category of warnings which were con-
demned in that decision.101
Justice Marshall then took issue with the reasoning in the con-
curring opinion. Justice Marshall argued that the rationale in Stone
was based on considerations unique to fourth amendment claims
and, therefore, this rationale cannot be extended to Miranda
claims.' 0 2 On a broader level, Justice Marshall expressed his view
that Stone was a wrongly decided case which should not be
followed.103
Justice Marshall then considered the reasoning employed in
Stone and Justice O'Connor's weighing process and concluded that
unlike the fourth amendment claims in Stone, the benefits of hearing
Miranda claims on federal collateral review outweigh the costs. He
first pointed out that while the evidence being excluded due to
fourth amendment violations is physical in . nature and therefore
both probative and reliable, 10 4 the evidence excluded due to Mi-
randa violations is non-physical and presumptively unreliable. 105 He
then asserted that whereas the exclusionary rule was established to
99 Justice Marshall stated that the majority's reasoning "let[s] the state-law tail wag
the federal constitutional dog." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
101 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2888-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 2889 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,494 n.37
(1976)).
103 Id. at 2890-91. (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall opposed limiting habeas
jurisdiction, stating:
I vehemently oppose the suggestion that it is for the Court to decide, based on our
own vague notions of comity, finality, and the intrinsic value of particular constitu-
tional rights, which claims are worthy of collateral federal review and which are not.
Congress already engaged in that balancing process when it created habeas review.
Id. at 2893 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
104 Stone, 428 U.S. at 490.
105 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2891 (Marshall,J, dissenting) (citing New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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deter police misconduct,10 6 the rights secured by Miranda warnings
"go to the heart of our accusitorial system"' 0 7 and were established
to protect the suspect's right against coercive self-incrimination.10 8
Marshall thus weighed the benefits of preventing coercive self-in-
crimination against the costs of excluding presumptively unreliable
evidence and found the benefits of federal habeas review of Miranda
claims to outweigh its costs.
Finally, Justice Marshall finds the distinction between constitu-
tional and nonconstitutional Miranda claims to be both incorrect
and impractical. Since Miranda decided that no statement taken
while in custody can be considered to be voluntary unless the sus-
pect has been advised of his rights, all statements made without the
warnings or made pursuant to defective warnings must be consid-
ered to be the product of coercion. 0 9 Therefore, there can be no
nonconstitutional Miranda claim. 10 Furthermore, since federal dis-
trict courts would have to examine all claims to determine whether
they were constitutional or nonconstitutional, the practical benefits
of excluding federal habeas jurisdiction would be lost."'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. CLARITY AND THE COERCIVE EFFECTS OF THE DUCKWORTH
WARNINGS
At the core of the controversy in Duckworth is a problem which
arises when fulfilling the requirements established by Miranda. Mi-
randa requires the police to advise the suspect that he has the right
to the presence of counsel before and during any custodial interro-
gation, and that if he cannot afford such counsel, he may have an
attorney appointed for him prior to being questioned. However,
the right to presence of appointed counsel cannot be instantly exer-
cised upon request for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court stated
in Miranda that police stations need not have "station house law-
yers" present at all times to advise suspects who are brought in for
questioning.1 2 Second, only ajudge may determine whether or not
the suspect is indigent, and thus eligible to have counsel appointed
106 Stone, 482 U.S. at 486.
107 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2892 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 893 (7th
Cir. 1982) (rejecting the extension of Stone to Miranda claims).
109 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
1 10 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2892 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
''' Id. at 2892-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).




When a suspect requests appointed counsel, Miranda requires
merely that the police refrain from questioning him at that time.114
In order to question the suspect, the police must commence adver-
sarial proceedings. This requires an indictment and arraignment in
court. The police are required by Miranda "15 and McNabb v. United
States 16 to commence these proceedings "within a reasonable pe-
riod of time" if they choose to keep the suspect in custody. During
this period, the suspect will have to wait in jail until he appears in
front of a judge who will determine whether he is entitled to ap-
pointed counsel. This wait may be several days.
The problem is that the suspect has the right to the presence of
appointed counsel immediately after receiving the Miranda warnings
and before he is questioned," 17 but the justice system does not pro-
vide any mechanism for appointing counsel until long after the sus-
pect has been read his rights. The fact that the right to appointed
counsel is temporarily ineffectual may give the indigent suspect the
impression that the right does not exist at all.
The actual words used in traditional Miranda warnings make no
mention of the delay in an indigent suspect's ability to speak with an
attorney."l 8 The warnings containing the "if and when you go to
court" phrase expressly inform the suspect of this delay.' 1 9 The is-
sue before the Court was whether explicitly mentioning the fact that
the exercise of the right to appointed counsel is subject to delay
made the warnings so unclear as to be inadequate. 120
Prior to Duckworth, there was a split among the courts as to
whether warnings containing the "if and when you go to court" ca-
veat are clear under the standard set by Miranda.12 The minority of
courts found these warnings to be unclear. 122 The reasoning used
113 See Thompson v. State, 256 Ind. 48, 54, 267 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1971).
114 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
115 The Court stated that "[i]f authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel
during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they
may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege."
Id.
116 318 U.S. 322, 344 (1943) (holding that "police must with reasonable promptness
show legal cause for detaining arrested persons").
117 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 410 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). Cf. Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1964).
118 See supra note 55 for full text of original Miranda warnings.
119 See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the full text of this warning.
120 Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2878 (1989).
121 Id.; Wright v. North Carolina, 415 U.S. 936 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
122 See, e.g., Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1556-57 (7th Cir. 1988); United
States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1972); Gilpin v.
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in these decisions was basically expressed in United States ex rel. Wil-
liams v. Twomey. 123 There, the court stated:
[T]he statement that no lawyer can be provided at the moment and
can only be obtained if and when the accused reaches court substan-
tially restricts the absolute right to counsel [granted in Miranda]; it
conveys the contradictory alternative message that an indigent is first
entitled to counsel upon an appearance in court at some unknown,
future time. The entire warning is therefore, at best, misleading and
confusing and, at worst, constitutes a subtle temptation to the unso-
phisticated indigent accused to forego the right to counsel at this criti-
cal moment [when the warnings are read and the suspect must decide
whether to waive his rights].' 24
This reasoning is sound in that warnings containing the "if and
when you go to court" language are actually conveying a contradic-
tory message. The suspect is told all at once of his right to speak
with appointed counsel before any interrogation and of his inability
to receive this counsel at the time that the warnings are being read
to him. The problem with this reasoning is that although the
message conveyed by the "if and when" language is contradictory, it
is in fact true because the rights of indigent suspects, as interpreted
by the courts, are themselves contradictory. 25
Also, asJustice Marshall noted, warnings containing the "if and
when you go to court" phrase act as a coercive force on the sus-
pect.12 6 Justice Marshall quoted Justice DeBruler in his concurrence
in Dickerson v. State,127
"[The suspect] is effectively told that he can talk now or remain in
United States, 415 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1969); Sullin v. United States, 389 F.2d 985,
988 n.2 (10th Cir. 1968) (dictum); Square v. State, 283 Ala. 548, 550, 219 So. 2d 377,
378-79 (1969); State v. Grierson, 95 Idaho 155, 158 n.1, 504 P.2d 1204, 1207 n.1 (1972)
(dictum); State v. Dess, 184 Mont. 116, 120-22, 602 P.2d 142, 144-45 (1979); Common-
wealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 352-57, 399 A.2d 111, 112-15 (1979); see also United
States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134
(9th Cir. 1970); Lathers v. United States, 396 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1968) (decisions re-
jecting similar warnings). Cf United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 400 F.2d 593 (9th Cir.
1968) (discussing clarity in the translation of the warnings into Spanish).
123 Twomey, 467 F.2d at 1248.
124 Id. at 1250.
125 See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
126 In Commonwealth v. Johnson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the
warnings conveyed the message that "[tihere is no way you can get a lawyer now if you
can't afford one, but you must still decide, without one, whether you are willing to an-
swer our questions," and that "veiled threats are certainly not what the Supreme Court
[in Mfiranda] had in mind." 484 Pa. at 356 n.2, 399 A.2d at 115 n.2. However, the police
may force a suspect to make this choice on his own even if his attorney is trying to reach
him. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
127 Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting




custody-in an alien, friendless, harsh world-for an indeterminate
length of time.... [T]he implication that his choice is to answer ques-
tions right away or remain in custody until that nebulous time 'if and
when' he goes to court is a coerced choice of the most obvious kind."
This is an accurate statement of what warnings containing the "if
and when you go to court" phrase tell indigent suspects. 12 8 This
coercion would also be extenuated by the circumstances surround-
ing the reading of the warnings. 129
Keeping a suspect in custody until his first court appearance if
he chooses not to speak is certainly coercion because suspects might
feel compelled to answer questions in order to avoid this imprison-
ment. However, if the traditional Miranda warnings were given and
the suspect asked for an appointed counsel, the police could then
explain to the suspect that they will stop questioning him, but that
they are going to lock him up until they decide to bring him to
court. The courts could not recognize this as being a coercive situa-
tion as long as the lock-up was only for a reasonable period of time.
Therefore, if this scenario will not be viewed as coercive, then a sce-
nario in which the Duckworth warnings are read and the suspect un-
derstands his options without having to ask any questions also
cannot be seen as coercive. Since the underlying situation is the
same regardless of which warning is read to the suspect, the "if and
when you go to court" language cannot be seriously considered to
be coercive in and of itself.
Justice Marshall's opposition to the insertion of the "if and
when you go to court" phrase into the traditional Miranda warnings
is therefore misplaced. The coercion that he and others complain of
is a result of the existing procedure for appointing counsel and not a
result of warnings containing the "if and when you go to court"
phrase. Indigent suspects will still be imprisoned when they request
counsel regardless of which warnings are read to them. Therefore,
ifJustice Marshall is unwilling to find the existing procedure for ap-
pointing counsel coercive, then he should not attack warnings which
are merely an accurate reflection of this procedure. 3 0
128 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
129 These circumstances include the fact that the policeman is being simultaneously
put in the opposing roles of advocate and interrogator. See Ogletree, Are Confessions Re-
ally Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1843
(1987). Logically, these circumstances also include the suspect's lack of education and
his/her fear or anger or both at being in police custody.
130 Justice Marshall stated that "[tihe threat of indefinite deferral of interrogation...
constitutes an effective means by which the police can pressure a suspect to speak with-
out the presence of counsel." Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
But since he would not find Indiana's procedure for appointing counsel to be unconsti-
tutional, this criticism rings hollow.
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Courts approving the warnings in Duckworth have ignored the
"if and when you go to court" phrase. Instead, they concentrated
on the suspect's understanding of his/her rights to remain silent
and to have counsel before and during questioning, and his/her un-
derstanding that the police must refrain from questioning him/her
until counsel is appointed. This basic reasoning was relied upon in
United States v. Lacy 131 where that court found the warning to be ade-
quate because "the defendant was informed that (a) he had the right
to the presence of an attorney and (b) that the right was to have an
attorney 'before he uttered a syllable.' "132 The Lacy court then
noted that the apparent linkage of the appointment of counsel to a
future date "seems immaterial since Lacy was informed that he had
the right to put off answering any questions until the time when he
did have an appointed attorney."' 133 Other courts have used similar
reasoning by holding that, when read in their entirety, the warnings
adequately inform suspects of their rights. 134 Thus, all the courts
approving this modified warning have relied upon the presence of
other statements which advise the suspect of his right to appointed
counsel, and his right to remain silent until this counsel is produced
for him.
This reasoning has been subject to the criticism that, while
these modified warnings are easily understandable to people who
possess a sophisticated knowledge of law or logic, they may not be
readily understandable to the uneducated and unsophisticated peo-
ple who are most often subjected to police questioning. 135 Several
131 446 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1971).
132 Id. at 513.
133 Id.; see also Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973); Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 308 (8th Cir.
1969); Mayzak v. United States, 402 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1968) (all holding that the
fact that the defendant was not informed of his right to instant counsel is irrelevant to
the validity of Miranda warnings).
134 See Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1567 (1988) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (refer-
ring to this standard as the "totality of circumstances" test); see also Wright v. North
Carolina, 483 F.2d 405, 407-08 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v.
Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1971); State v.
Mumbaugh, 107 Ariz. 589, 596-97, 491 P.2d 443, 450-51 (1971); State v. Sterling, 377
So. 2d 58, 62-63 (La. 1979); People v. Campbell, 26 Mich. App. 196, 201-02, 182
N.W.2d 4, 6-7 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971); Harrell v. State, 537 So. 2d 643,
645-46 (Miss. 1978); People v. Swift, 32 App. Div. 2d 183, 186-187, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639,
643-44 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018 (1970); Grennier v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 204, 213-
15, 234 N.W.2d 316, 321-322 (1975); see also Richardson v. Duckworth, 834 F.2d 1366,
1372 (7th Cir. 1987); De La Rosa v. Texas, 743 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1984); Coyote v.
United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992 (1967) (each
decision adopts the "totality of the circumstances" test).
135 Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Common-
wealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 355, 399 A.2d, 111, 114 (1979).
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courts, while approving the content of these warnings, have also rec-
ognized the .validity of this criticism. Two of these courts admon-
ished police forces not to use these warnings. 13 6 Also, four of these
courts explicitly recognized that, taken in isolation, the "if and when
you go to court" phrase is confusing. 137
These criticisms suggest that the warnings in Duckworth cannot
seriously be considered to be a more clear and unequivocal advise-
ment of a suspect's rights than the original warnings stated in Mi-
randa.13 8 This point is illustrated by an examination of the litigation
involved in Duckworth. Seven of the eighteen judges ruling on this
case found the warnings given to Eagan to be. ambiguous. This
point is also supported by the existence of a split in the courts as to
the clarity of these warnings. If judges cannot agree that warnings
with the "if and when you go to court" phrase are clear, then it can
hardly be argued that uneducated and unsophisticated indigent sus-
pects could find them to be perfectly clear.
Perhaps it was for this reason that the Court in Duckworth did
not find the warnings given to Eagan to be clear and unequivocal.
Rather, the warnings were found valid merely because they reason-
ably conveyed to the suspect his rights. 139 It is here that this case
could have its greatest impact on the analysis of Miranda warnings.
The Chief Justice lowered the standard for clarity in Miranda warn-
ings from the requirement that they must be "clear and unequivo-
cal"'140 to the requirement that they need'only reasonably convey to
the suspect his rights. 14 1 In support of this change, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that a rigorous examination of the language used
in the warnings is not necessary.' 42 The ChiefJustice concluded by
136 Harrell, 357 So. 2d at 645; Grennier, 70 Wis. 2d at 215, 234 N.W.2d at 322.
'37 Sterling, 377 So. 2d at 63 ("Taken in isolation this language may instill doubt in the
mind of the reader that defendant was fairly informed of his rights .. "); Harrell, 357
So. 2d at 646 ("[The remainder of the warning] certainly offsets any damage done by the
quoted sentence."); Campbell, 26 Mich. App. at 201-02, 182 N.W.2d at 7 ("The quoted
language may not be a triumph in precision of expression .. "); Grennier, 70 Wis. 2d at
213, 234 N.W.2d at 321 ("The warning... was arguably confusing and insufficient.").
138 Indeed one court rejected the warning, stating that "deviation from the prescribed
formulation of the various warnings [as stated in Miranda] would be permissible only
when the offered version is more likely to give a suspect a better understanding of his
constitutional rights .. " Johnson, 484 Pa. at 355-56, 399 A.2d at 115 (citing Common-
wealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 190, 266 A.2d 753, 755 (1970)).
139 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361
(1981)). The use of Prysock as authority for this proposition is quite disingenuous since
the Court in Pysock held that the warnings in question "fully conveyed to respondent his
rights as required by Miranda." Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361.
140 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466-67 (1966).
141 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
142 The Chief Justice stated that courts "'need not examine Miranda warnings as if
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holding that the warnings given to Eagan satisfied the requirements
of Miranda in their totality.143 He never held that the warnings con-
taining the "if and when you go to court" phrase were clear and
unequivocal.
This change can also be detected in what the Court left out of
its opinion. First, the close proximity of the "if and when you go to
court" language to the advisement of the right to the presence of
counsel was never discussed even though it is the basis for the Sev-
enth Circuit's rejection of the warnings. 144 Also, the majority never
discussed the possible confusion that can arise from the use of the
phrase "go to court." Justice Marshall pointed out that in common
parlance, "going to court" means "going to trial,"' 145 and certainly
the suspect is entitled to an attorney before that point. The failure
of the Court to encourage absolute clarity in Miranda warnings indi-
cates that the Court is not concerned with this issue.
As a result of the Duckworth decision, courts need only deter-
mine that the defendant cannot reasonably claim that he did not un-
derstand his rights based on the warnings given to him. In an
amicus curiae brief, the United States argued that the validity of
warnings should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 146 It would ap-
pear that in any future cases in which a defendant challenges the
validity of a variation of a Miranda warning, the prosecution will
have to prove that this variation was reasonable, and that it would be
unreasonable to find that the defendant did not understand his
rights. 147
Eagan argued that approving this change could lead to undesir-
able results since even Miranda warnings in their original form do
not achieve the goal of giving suspects a clear understanding of
their rights. 148 The Court ignored this argument since it serves to
construing a will or defining the terms of an easement." 109 S. Ct. at 2880. It is worth
noting, however, that this opinion left untouched the burden on the prosecution to show
that a particular set of warnings are valid under Miranda.
143 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2881.
144 Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1556-57 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing United States
ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1972) ("In one breath appel-
lant was informed that he had the right to appointed counsel during questioning. In the
next breath, he was told that counsel could not be provided until later.")).
145 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 The brief stated, "[Riather than measuring particular warnings against the words
of the Miranda opinion, the Court should determine whether the warnings in each case
provide the suspect with the information he needs to make a constitutionally binding
decision to speak with the police." Amicus Brief at 19, Duckworth (No. 88-317).
147 Cf Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
148 Brief for Respondent at 23 n.4, Duckworth (No. 88-317) (citing Grisso, Juveniles'
Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980);
Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 S.D.L. REV. 39 (1970); Leiken, Police
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disprove Eagan's case. Why should the Court insist on strict com-
pliance with Miranda when the exact use of the words in Miranda do
not adequately inform suspects of their rights? By changing to a
case-by-case approach, the courts can focus on the defendant's ac-
tual understanding of his rights rather than on semantics which
were supposed to serve as a proxy for actual understanding in the
first place. When stated in this manner, the change can be seen as
positive.
On the other hand, the lowering of the standard of clarity can
have harmful consequences. Authorizing textual changes can po-
tentially lead to further erosion of the understandability of the Mi-
randa warnings since other parts of the warnings could also be
altered. Miranda warnings are intended to serve as a procedural
safeguard to protect fifth amendment privileges, 14 9 and the viability
of this safeguard is necessary for the protection of fifth amendment
rights. As Justice Frankfurter stated in McNabb, "The history of lib-
erty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safe-
guards."1 50 Thus, affecting the viability of Miranda warnings by
lowering the standard of clarity can potentially lead to an erosion of
fifth amendment privileges themselves.
Justice Marshall characterized this decision as part of the "con-
tinuing debasement" of Miranda.5 1 This decision can be seen as
part of a continuing trend to limit and reduce the impact of the Mi-
randa decision. 15 2 Indeed, in light of Michigan v. Tucker,'53 any rul-
ing which finds the warnings in Duckworth invalid would be
hypocritical. In Tucker, the suspect was advised of his right to re-
main silent and to the presence of counsel, but he was never told of
his right to appointed counsel. 54 The Court held that impeaching
testimony obtained as a result of the interrogation after these warn-
ings was admissible since the Miranda warnings are not themselves
constitutional rights, 155 and the suspect's statements were given vol-
Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. U.L. REV. 1 (1970);
Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt
to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968)).
149 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
150 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
151 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 This trend began with the Burger Court and has continued to the present. For a
full discussion of the decline of Miranda, see Ogletree, supra note 129, at 1839-42. For a
general discussion of the current scope of Miranda, see Project: Criminal Procedure, 74 GEO.
LJ. 499, 594-610 (1986).
153 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
154 Id. at 436.
155 Id. at 444.
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untarily.' 56 Thus, if the Court is going to uphold the admissibility
of voluntary statements in the complete absence of the right to ap-
pointed counsel warning, then it certainly must uphold the admissi-
bility of voluntary statements given in response to warnings which
contain the right to appointed counsel warning, but which do not
convey this warning in the clearest form possible.
B. THE EXTENSION OF STONE TO MIRANDA CLAIMS
Another step in limiting (if not overruling) Miranda was sug-
gested injustice O'Connor's concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor
contended that "nonconstitutional" or technical claims of Miranda
violations should not be cognizable in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings where the issue has been fully and fairly litigated in the
state courts. 157 Justice O'Connor's suggestion is derived from the
concept that evidence should never be excluded through federal
habeas proceedings where it is reliable and probative of the defend-
ant's guilt. 158 The problem with recognizing non-guilt related
claims is that since federal habeas proceedings always occur several
years after the original trial, a new trial may be impossible, and thus
habeas writs can set admittedly guilty criminals free. 159 Judges and
legal scholars have recognized this as a problem with exclusionary
rules.160
The argument that convicted defendants should not go free as a
result of the application of the exclusionary rule in federal habeas
proceedings was accepted in Stone.16 1 In that case the Supreme
Court held that "[W]here the state has provided an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
156 Id. at 449.
157 Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2883-84 (1989) (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
158 See id. at 2884 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159 Id. at 2884 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160 E.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-29 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
("We exclude evidence only when essential to safeguard the integrity of the truth-seek-
ing process. The test, in short, is the reliability of the evidence."); Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 237, 242 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) ("In collateral attacks ... I
would always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim
that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt."); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150
N.E. 585, 587-88, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926) (Discussing the effects of an exclusion-
ary rule, Justice Cardozo stated, "The criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered .... We may not subject society to these dangers until the legislature has
spoken with a clearer voice." (arguing that the exclusionary rule must be established by
legislation or a constitutional amendment)); see also Friendly, supra note 88, at 142 (semi-
nal article arguing that only claims related to guilt or innocence should be cognizable on
federal habeas corpus).
161 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was in-
troduced at his trial."1 62 This decision was reached by balancing the
costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule formulated in
Mapp v. Ohio 163 in federal habeas proceedings. The Court in Stone
noted that the evidence excluded under this rule tends to be typi-.
cally reliable and probative, and applying an exclusionary rule tends
to set the guilty free.' 64 The Court also argued that the Mapp exclu-
sionary rule is " 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent ef-
fect ... ' "165 The Court thus held that since the benefit of deter-
ring police misconduct was marginal at best when the Mapp
exclusionary rule was applied in federal habeas proceedings,166 and
since the costs of applying this rule were extremely high, fourth
amendment claims would no longer be cognizable in federal habeas
proceedings.' 67
After Stone, the Supreme Court had several opportunities to ex-
tend Stone to Miranda claims, but chose not to do so.' 68 The Court
refused to extend the Stone rationale to bar habeas litigation on the
issue of racial discrimination in the selection of a state grand jury
foreperson in Rose v. Mitchell,169 and did not discuss the respon-
dent's argument to extend Stone to double jeopardy claims in Greene
v. Massey.' 70 In fact, Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in
Stone and then cast the fifth vote not to extend it to Mirdnda claims in
Brewer v. Williams. 171
Also, the lower federal courts have almost unaminously ruled
162 Id. at 494. However, these claims must still be entertained on direct review. Id. at
493.
163 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (The Supreme Court held that the effectuation of the fourth
amendment as applied through the fourteenth amendment requires the exclusion at trial
of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure aid reversal of convic-
tion upon direct review in state criminal trials.)
164 428 U.S. at 490.
165 Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
166 Id. at 493-94.
167 Id. at 494.
168 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n. 11 (1977); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
169 443 U.S. 545 (1979). The petitioner's guilt was not disputed in that case.
170 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
171 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); see also White v. Finkbeiner, 687
F.2d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984). But see
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Powell apparently agreed with ChiefJustice Burger's idea of limiting habeas juris-
diction to claims related to the guilt of the petitioner in that he criticized the




against the extension of Stone to Miranda claims. 172 These courts
have found that since the Supreme Court has consistently declined
to extend Stone, they would not do so themselves.17 3 Thus, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion is an invitation for concerned par-
ties to litigate this issue before the Supreme Court so that Stone can
be extended to include Miranda claims. This potentially represents
a significant shift in the Court's willingness to limit federal habeas
jurisdiction over a variety of constitutional claims. 174
The analysis in Stone could apply to all constitutional claims not
related to guilt since there is no logical reason why it must be lim-
ited to the Mapp exclusionary rule. 175 Indeed, the Stone decision was
called the "harbinger of future eviscerations" of federal habeas ju-
risdiction by Justice Brennan in his dissent in that case.176 Further-
more, Miranda and Mapp exclusionary rules are, at least
superficially, similar. Neither rule is necessarily related to the guilt
of the habeas petitioner. Since there can be a technical violation of
Miranda without any violation of the fifth amendment prohibition of
coerced testimony,177 it is possible for a Miranda claim to have no
bearing on the question of guilt. 178
For these reasons, Justice O'Connor applied the weighing pro-
cess used in Stone to determine whether or not to bar relitigation of
Miranda claims on collateral review. She found the costs of interfer-
ing with society's interest in convicting and punishing criminals to
172 For cases declining to extend Stone, see, for example, the following: McCown v.
Callahan, 726 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984); White, 687 F.2d at
888-94; Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 349 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1048 (1982); Patterson v. Warden of San Luis Obispo, 624 F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1980);
Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 872 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Wilson v. Hender-
son, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945 (1979). See alsoJarrell
v. Balkom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 1984), in which the court declined to
extend Stone to fifth amendment claims generally. But see Richardson v. Stone, 421 F.
Supp. 577, 578-79 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (the one decision extending Stone to Miranda claims).
173 McCown, 726 F.2d at 5; White, 687 F.2d at 890; Hanyman, 616 F.2d at 872 n.l;
Jarrell, 735 F.2d at 1252.
174 There are potentially enough votes to extend Stone to Miranda claims as ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and Stevens were part of the majority in Stone,
Justice O'Connor wrote this concurring opinion, Justice Scalia joined this concurrence,
and neitherJustice Stevens norJustice Blackmunjoined in the part ofJustice Marshall's
dissent which disagreed with Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. Only Justices
White, Brennan, and Marshall seem to disagree with this notion.
175 White, 687 F.2d at 891.
176 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 516 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177 Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2883 (1989) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (cit-
ing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974)).
178 In fact, the one decision which did extend Stone to a Miranda claim justified its
decision by stating that the petitioner made no claim of innocence to supplement his
constitutional claim. Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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outweigh the benefits that come from enforcing the judicially cre-
ated, prophylactic safeguard of proper Miranda warnings through
collateral review. 179 Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that Mi-
randa claims seeking suppression of probative evidence should not
be cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings.1 80
This would be a big mistake. The fact that the Stone weighing
process can be used to determine whether or not to bar habeas re-
view of Miranda claims does not mean that the results would be simi-
lar when that process was applied to both fourth amendment and
Miranda claims. First, the types of evidence which are excluded by
the Mapp and Miranda exclusionary rules are fundamentally differ-
ent. Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure
tends to be physical, such as "a pistol, a packet of heroin, counter-
feit money, or the body of a murder victim,"181 and is not rendered
untrustworthy by the means of its seizure.18 2 Thus, the application
of Mapp excludes reliable evidence of guilt. On the other hand, evi-
dence obtained as a result of a violation of a suspect's Miranda rights
is presumptively unreliable.183 This is because statements obtained
as a result of such a violation are presumed to be coerced. 184 So,
when a Miranda claim is raised, the petitioner is bringing into issue
the integrity of the fact-finding process of the trial court by claiming
that he was convicted with unreliable evidence. 185 Therefore, while
the exclusion of probative evidence through the Mapp exclusionary
rule interferes with the fact-finding process, the exclusion of unreli-
able evidence through Miranda actually enhances the fact-finding
process.
Second, while the Mapp exclusionary rule supposedly exists
only for the deterrence of police misconduct, the Miranda rules pri-
marily exist not only to deter police misconduct, but to "protect a
criminal suspect's exercise of the privilege [against self-incrimina-
tion] which is one of the distinctive components of our criminal
law."'18 6 As the Court stated in Miranda, "The requirement of warn-
ings and waiver of rights is fundamental with respect to the Fifth
179 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
180 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2884 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181 Stone, 428 U.S. at 497 (Burger, Cj., concurring).
182 Id. at 490 (citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
183 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2891 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 479, 654 (1984)).
184 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985).
185 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2892 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)).
186 White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 893 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing
methods of interrogation." 18 7 Thus, the benefits that come from
federal habeas review of Miranda claims are not merely the deter-
rence of police misconduct as Justice O'Connor claims, 8 8 but the
preservation of the integrity of the fact-finding process.
Finally, Justice O'Connor suggests that the Court should distin-
guish between constitutional and nonconstitutional Miranda
claims. 189 In other words, claims of coercion or involuntary waiver
of rights would be constitutional Miranda claims, while claims of Mi-
randa violations without accompanying claims of coercion would be
nonconstitutional Miranda claims. Constitutional claims would be
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings while nonconstitutional
claims would not be cognizable. She makes this distinction because
the fifth amendment only requires the exclusion of coerced state-
ments. 90 This separation would overrule the basic premise of Mi-
randa which is the assumption that "unless a suspect taken into
custody is properly advised of his rights, no statement obtained
from [the suspect] can truly be the product of his free choice as a
matter of federal law." 19' Justice O'Connor's opinion would dis-
credit this assumption, and the federal courts would be forced to
return to the case-by-case "totality of circumstances" test to deter-
mine the voluntariness of each confession which was largely re-
placed by Miranda.192
A return to the case-by-case approach would mean that the sup-
posed benefits of barring federal habeas review of state convictions,
the reduction of tension between state and federal courts, 193 and the
reduction of the workload of the federal judiciary 94 could not be
realized. The case-by-case approach actually increases the judicial
workload since much more than the circumstances surrounding the
warnings would have to be examined in order to determine the vol-
untariness of the confession. Even then, it remains difficult to accu-
rately determine the voluntariness of the confession.' 95
Furthermore, since the "totality of circumstances" test is more com-
plicated and uncertain, its application is likely to lead to a wider vari-
187 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
188 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2884 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189 Id. at 2883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190 Id. at 2883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191 Id. at 2892 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458).
192 White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 893 (7th Cir. 1982); Halpern, Federal Habeas
Corpus and the AIapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUm. L REV. 1, 40 (1982).
193 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2884 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194 White, 687 F.2d at 893.
195 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 683 (1984).
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ance in opinions and more opportunity for the federal courts to
"overrule" state courts.' Thus, tension between federal and state
courts would be heightened and not reduced. Justice O'Connor's
problems with federal district courts overruling state supreme
courts is thus with the existence of federal habeas jurisdiction in
general, and not with this particular application of it.
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of Duckworth, Miranda warnings containing a sen-
tence which says that the suspect can only obtain appointed counsel
"if and when he goes to court" is valid because warnings containing
this phrase "reasonably convey" to a suspect his/her rights. This
decision lowers the standard of clarity required of Miranda warn-
ings. While lowering the standard for clarity is not desirable in light
of the fact that Miranda warnings are not adequately understood by
suspects in their traditional form, the Duckworth ruling made sense
in that the Duckworth warnings accurately describe the procedure for
obtaining appointed counsel. Since a suspect requesting appointed
counsel would be told by the police that he/she will not receive such
counsel until he/she goes to court, it does not make sense to say
that because the warnings serve to advise the suspect of this fact,
they are invalid. If these warnings seem coercive, it is because the
procedure is coercive, and if this is troublesome, the procedure for
appointing counsel should be changed and not the application of
the warnings.
Justice O'Connor signalled that the Supreme Court would con-
sider extending Stone v. Powell to bar claims of technical violations of
Miranda from being cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. While the weighing process used in Stone may be used to ana-
lyze this contention, the results reached from such a process lead to
the conclusion that Miranda claims should remain cognizable in fed-
eral habeas proceedings. This is because the costs and benefits of
applying the Mapp exclusionary rule differ dramatically from the
those of the Miranda exclusionary rule. Therefore, Stone should not
be extended to cover either technical Miranda claims in particular or
fifth amendment claims in general.
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